

COLL 17-SR

ICS 7900-88

6 December 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Lieutenant General Edward J. Heinz, USAF
Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT: Threat to the Security of Intelligence Community
Automated Information Systems and Networks

REFERENCE: Your Memo, ER 88-4099/1 of 22 October 1988

25X1 1. Attached for your concurrence is a proposed preface to the 1988-1989 threat statement you recently approved for publication. If you agree, we will include it in the printed version now in preparation. A summary of the senior executive panel's findings is being prepared, and will be disseminated to top-level recipients of the threat statement. ☐

25X1 2. I share the concern expressed in reference regarding Community management's perception of the threat to our automated information systems (AIS) and networks and the adequacy of measures being taken to reduce our vulnerabilities. We are making progress toward getting a better grip on the problem, in terms of developing needed technology and establishing the policy and management basis for Community action. In the latter regard, the recent revision of DCID 1/16 has filled a major gap with respect to DCI requirements and objectives. ☐

25X1

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Threat to the Security of Intelligence Community
Automated Information Systems and Networks

25X1 4. What is required, I believe, is a pragmatic strategy that focuses on those areas of our overall vulnerability in which the evidenced threat and prospective loss are greatest and which can be addressed effectively with a reasonable resource investment. Delineating such a strategy will undoubtedly be difficult and disputatious, and it may be desirable to have it done by an interagency or agency-industry panel in which the Program Managers have direct representation. As a start, I have asked the senior executive panel which oversaw preparation of the 1988-89 threat assessment to develop a paper outlining its recommendations regarding the focal points of counteraction.

25X1 5. In addition to a credible action strategy, we will need more active and visible DCI/DDCI participation, particularly in ensuring that adequate NFIP resources are programmed and that necessary program manager followthrough occurs. Computer and information security should also receive priority consideration in the next DCI reserve allocation. When we have decided on an appropriate action strategy, I recommend a full-dress briefing of the NFIB/NFIC with DCI/DDCI underscoring.

25X1 25X1 6. To broaden awareness of both our assessment of the threat to Community AIS and networks and the DCI's applicable policy (DCID 1/16), IHC staff members have been briefing key organizations throughout the Community and in the Defense establishment. In addition, in cooperation with OTE, we are completing preparation of a formal training course that will address the threat and countermeasures. It is intended for wide enrollment of government and contractor personnel at both the management and working levels.

Edward J. Heinz
Lieutenant General, USAF

Attachment:
As Stated

SECRET

THREAT STATEMENT PREFACE

APPROVED:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date

DISAPPROVED:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date

SUBJECT: Threat to the Security of Intelligence Community
Automated Information Systems and Networks

Distribution: ICS 7900-88

Orig - DDCI

1 - D/ICS

1 - ER

1 - IHC Subj (VLB)

1 - IHC Chrono

1 - ICS Reg

STAT

DCI/ICS/IHC (5Dec88)

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied